Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective by Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Mentalism versus behaviourism in
economics: a philosophy-of-science
perspective
Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian
CNRS, Paris, France, UEA, Norwich, UK, LSE, London, UK
1 April 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37813/
MPRA Paper No. 37813, posted 16 Apr 2012 12:50 UTC
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics:
a philosophy-of-science perspective
Franz Dietrich
CNRS & University of East Anglia
Christian List
London School of Economics
1 April 2012
Abstract
Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in
social-scientic theories are auxiliary constructs re-describing peoples behav-
ioural dispositions. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, no
less existent than the unobservable entities and properties in the natural sciences,
such as electrons and electromagnetic elds. While behaviourism has long gone
out of fashion in psychology and linguistics, it remains the dominant orthodoxy
in economics, especially in the form of revealed preference theory. We aim to
(i) clear up some common conceptual confusions about the two views in eco-
nomics, (ii) situate the debate in a broader historical and philosophical context,
and (iii) defend a mentalist approach to economics. Setting aside normative con-
cerns about behaviourism, we show that mentalism is in line with best scientic
practice even if economics is treated as a purely positive science of human social
behaviour. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeco-
nomic view that social behaviour should be explained in terms of peoples brain
processes, as distinct from their mental states.
1 Introduction
Economic theory seeks to explain the social and economic behaviour of human (and
sometimes other) agents.1 It usually does so by (i) ascribing  at least in an as if
mode  certain mental states, such as beliefs and desires, to the agents in question and
(ii) showing that, under the assumption that those agents are rational, the ascribed
This paper was originally presented at the Choice Group workshop on Rationalizability and
Choice, held in July 2011 at the LSE. We are grateful to the participants, as well as Richard
Bradley, for comments and discussion.
1We here focus on micro-economic theory. Other agents to which the theory is sometimes applied
include corporate agents and even non-human animals (in behavioural ecology). On corporate agency,
see List and Pettit (2011). On biological applications, see a special issue on group decision making
in humans and animals, edited (with introduction) by Conradt and List (2009).
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mental states lead us to predict (and thereby to rationalize) the behaviour to be
explained.2 For example, we may ask why Franz went to Starbucks at 4:30pm on a
particular afternoon and then left a few minutes later with a cappuccino in his hand.
The answer is that he had a desire to drink co¤ee and a belief that there was co¤ee
available at Starbucks, so that it was rational for him to take the action. Classical
economic theory formalizes this explanation by representing Franzs desires in terms
of a preference ordering or utility function over various outcomes and his beliefs
in terms of a subjective probability function over various states of the world, and
by dening as rational any action that maximizes expected utility. Setting aside the
technical terminology, the logic underlying this explanation is very similar to the logic
underlying ordinary folk-psychological reasoning with its ascription of mental states
to explain behaviour. Economic explanations can thus be seen as more sophisticated
and scientically elaborated reconstructions of folk psychology.3
But what is the status of the ascribed mental states and of the resulting explana-
tion of Franzs behaviour? In particular, are the ascribed mental states
(1) mere re-descriptions of certain behavioural patterns and perhaps instrumentally
useful constructs for organizing and making sense of empirical regularities,
or are they
(2) genuinely real phenomena, no less existent than the objects and properties
posited by our best theories in the natural sciences, such as electrons, neu-
trinos, and electromagnetic elds, which  like mental states  are not directly
observable?
Roughly, behaviourism is the rst of these two views, whereasmentalism is the second;
we will make this more precise later.
Behaviourism used to be the dominant view across the behavioural sciences, in-
cluding not only economics, where it was pioneered by scholars such as Vilfredo Pareto
(1848-1923), Paul Samuelson (1915-2009), and Milton Friedman (1912-2006), but also
psychology and linguistics, where it was prominently expressed, for example, by Ivan
Pavlov (1849-1936) and B. F. Skinner (1904-1990). In the latter disciplines  espe-
cially since Noam Chomskys inuential critique (1959) of Skinner  behaviourism
has long been replaced by some versions of mentalism, though usually under di¤erent
names, such as cognitivism or rationalism. In economics, by contrast, behaviourism
continues to be very inuential and even the dominant orthodoxy. The revealed pref-
erence paradigm, in many of its standard forms, is behaviouristic, though there are
more and less radical versions of it. Recently, Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
(2008) have o¤ered a passionate defence of what they call a mindless economics, a
2For an overview of theories of choice and rationalization, see Bossert and Suzumura (2010).
3Economics thereby exemplies a familiar feature of science more generally, which Quine has fa-
mously described as common sense gone self-conscious (Quine 1960). On the relationship between
economic decision theory and folk psychology, see also Pettit (1991).
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particularly radical form of behaviourism.
In this paper, we aim to clear up some common conceptual confusions about be-
haviourism and mentalism in economics, situate the debate within the broader context
of the philosophy of science, and defend a mentalist approach to economics, which
we argue is in line with best scientic practice. We thereby reject Gul and Pesendor-
fers case for behaviourism, though we do so from a di¤erent, more philosophy-of-
science-oriented perspective than earlier, for instance normative-economic and neu-
roeconomic, responses to them (e.g., K½oszegi and Rabin 2007, Harrison 2008, and
the contributions to Caplin and Schotters 2008 collection; some of our criticisms are
shared by Hausman 2008). Crucially, we show that a case for mentalism can be made
even if economics is treated exclusively as a positive science of human socio-economic
behaviour and not as any sort of normative enterprise. We briey revisit some other
responses to behaviourism at the end of this paper.
In fact, we agree with one methodological concern voiced by Gul and Pesendorfer:
the concern about the appropriate level of explanation in economics. Here, we suggest,
Gul and Pesendorfer are right in criticizing the attempts of the most radical economic
psychologists to reduce decision theory to neuro-physiology. But Gul and Pesendorfer
draw the wrong conclusions from this. Far from supporting a mindless economics,
rejecting the attempt to reduce economics to neuroscience is entirely consistent with
accepting a mentalist appproach to economic theory. The failure to recognize this
point may stem from a failure to distinguish clearly between the notions of mind and
brain. The former is a macro-level, psychological notion, the latter a micro-level,
physiological one. The most compelling forms of mentalism entail precisely the view
that the study of rationality and action cannot be reduced to the neuro-physiological
study of the brain and body.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review and contextualize
Gul and Pesendorfers central claims. In Section 3, we identify four misconceptions
underlying them. In Section 4, we introduce some key concepts from the philosophy
of science, which help us clarify the di¤erence between behaviourism and mentalism.
In Section 5, we distinguish between two kinds of revealed preference approaches to
economic theory  an epistemological and an ontological one  and show that only
the more radical and less plausible approach commits us to behaviourism. In Section
6, we state our argument for mentalism more positively. In Section 7, we argue that
the di¤erence between mentalism and behaviourism is not just a metaphysical matter
but also relevant to the practice of economics. In Section 8, we distinguish mental-
ism from  and argue against  the radical neuroeconomic view that socio-economic
behaviour should be explained in terms of the relevant agents brain processes, as
distinct from their mental states. In Section 8, we conclude.
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2 The case for mindless economics
Gul and Pesendorfers paper, The case for mindless economics (2008), provides a
useful starting point for our discussion. The paper makes at least three claims about
economic science (the positive rather than normative part of economics):
 The only evidence that should be used to test economic theories is evidence
about peoples choice behaviour.
 The content of any economic theory consists solely in its choice-behavioural
implications; two theories that are choice-behaviourally equivalent should be
seen as equivalent simpliciter.
 Any economic theory should ideally take the form of a characterization of the
totality of its choice-behavioural implications, and that characterization should
take the form of attributing to the agents the maximization of some objective
function.
The rst of these claims concerns the evidential base of a theory in economics,
the second its semantic content or meaning, and the third the methodology of theory
construction. In addition to making these positive claims, Gul and Pesendorfer also
express scepticism towards any form of normative economics that goes beyond a very
thin kind of revealed-preference Paretianism, i.e., the assessment of socio-economic
institutions or outcomes in terms of whether they are Pareto e¢cient relative to
peoples revealed preferences. For present purposes, however, we set the case of
normative economics aside.
In essence, Gul and Pesendorfer hold that (positive) economics should be the
science of choice behaviour, and that its evidence base, ontology of the world, and
formal structure should focus solely on peoples observed or observable choices. Al-
though they do not situate their views in the context of earlier behaviouristic schools
of thought in psychology and related disciplines, Gul and Pesendorfers approach to
economics mirrors Pavlovs and Skinners approaches to psychology and the Vienna
Circles approach to the philosophy of science and language. In fact, each of their
central claims corresponds to a di¤erent historical variant of behaviourism (using the
taxonomy in Graham 2010).
The rst claim  about the evidence base of economics  corresponds to psy-
chological behaviourism, the view that human (and animal) behaviour should be
explained solely on the basis of behavioural evidence, such as evidence about exter-
nal physical stimuli, responses, learning histories, and (for certain types of behavior)
reinforcements (Graham 2010). If anything, the evidence accepted by those earlier
psychological behaviourists is less restricted than that accepted by Gul and Pesendor-
fer.
The second claim  about the semantic content or meaning of any theory in
economics  corresponds to analytical or logical behaviourism, the view associated
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Figure 1: Gul and Pesendorfers claims and their precursors
with the Vienna Circle, Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976), and some of Ludwig Wittgensteins
(1889-1951) work that the very idea of a mental state or condition is the idea of a
behavioral disposition or family of behavioral tendencies (Graham 2010). Accord-
ingly, [w]hen we attribute a belief ... to someone, we are not saying that he or she
is in a particular internal state or condition. Instead, we are characterizing the per-
son in terms of what he or she might do in particular situations or environmental
interactions (ibid.).
The third claim  about the methodology of theory construction in economics 
is analogous to methodological behaviourism in psychology in that it prescribes a
focus on behaviour rather than mental states in theory construction. Historically,
methodological behaviourism, as defended for instance by John Watson (1878-1958),
is the view that psychology should concern itself with the behavior of organisms and
not with mental states or events or with constructing internal information processing
accounts of behavior (Graham 2010). Accordingly, reference to mental states, such
as an animals beliefs or desires, adds nothing to what psychology can and should
understand about the sources of behavior (ibid.), and so a theorys goal should simply
be to characterize its behavioural implications. Gul and Pesendorfer strengthen that
demand by requiring that this characterization take the form of attributing to the
agent the maximization of some objective function.
Figure 1 summarizes the parallels between Gul and Pesendorfers claims and their
historical precursors in psychology and related disciplines. Given the extent to which
Gul and Pesendorfers claims mirror  and perhaps reinvent  earlier behaviouristic
claims, one might ask whether their views su¤er from the same problems that those
earlier behaviourisms su¤ered from and which ultimately led to their demise. In what
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follows, we draw on insights gained from some of those other cases to see what lessons
can be learnt for the case of economics.
3 Four misconceptions
We begin our defence of mentalism by arguing that Gul and Pesendorfers three posi-
tive claims, like their historical precursors, rest on at least four misconceptions, which
we will call the misconception of a xed evidence base, the evidence/content con-
ation, the unobservable, therefore non-existent fallacy, and the maximization
dogma.
3.1 The misconception of a xed evidence base
In line with psychological behaviourism, Gul and Pesendorfer argue that the only ev-
idence that should be used to test economic theories is evidence about peoples choice
behaviour. But there is no systematic reason why the evidence base of economics
should be restricted in this way. Across the sciences, it is a common phenomenon
that our available evidence base occasionally grows. Various things or phenomena
that people could not observe in the past, and which earlier generations might have
regarded as speculative, have eventually turned out to be observable, through the use
of more advanced instruments, more creative experimental designs, and so on.
In physics, entities and phenomena such as the Higgs boson and various elementary
particles, forces, and elds seemed at some point to be purely theoretical constructs,
but are being increasingly turned into observable entities and phenomena  albeit
indirectly observable ones  through the advances in sophistication in our instruments
and experimental techniques. The advances in microscopy over the centuries are a
perfect illustration of this point (on the lack of a static distinction between what is
observable and what is not, see, e.g., Maxwell 1962 and Shapere 1982).
In short, the idea that the evidence base of a particular scientic discipline should
be xed once and for all lacks any justication, given the history of science and the
experience of other scientic disciplines. Rather, the evidence base of any science
is changeable and dynamic, and there is no reason why economics should be an
exception. Accordingly, even if there was a period in the history of economics when
peoples choice behaviour was the only evidence used to test theories, there is no
principled reason why other kinds of evidence  from peoples verbal reports and
communicative behaviour to physiological and neuroscientic evidence  could not
also be relevant.
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3.2 The evidence/content conation
In line with analytical or logical behaviourism, Gul and Pesendorfer argue that the
content of any economic theory consists solely in its choice-behavioural implications;
two theories that are choice-behaviourally equivalent should be seen as equivalent
simpliciter. But even if the evidence base of economic theories were restricted to
observable choice behaviour alone  and, as we have seen, there is no principled reason
why it should be  it would not follow that the content of any economic theory should
consist solely in its choice-behavioural implications. Rather, the content of a theory
can, and often does, go well beyond its evidence base. To see that this is not just
an esoteric possibility, but the norm across many scientic disciplines, consider a few
simple examples:
Archaeology and ancient history: The evidence base for theories in these sub-
jects consists paradigmatically of various archaeological objects and artefacts found
in excavations. But the content of those theories goes well beyond these objects and
artefacts. The content, ultimately, is the life, social organization, and culture of the
ancient societies in question. The reason why we are interested in old pots, pans, and
other broken items is not just that these objects are interesting in their own right,
but that they tell us something we cannot directly observe: namely how people lived
in the societies under investigation.
Paleobiology: A natural- rather than social-scientic discipline that illustrates
our point is paleobiology. Here the evidence base consists of geological ndings and
fossils, but the aim of the discipline is to answer biological questions about the evo-
lution of life and its underlying molecular-biological mechanisms. Again, the content
of the relevant theories goes well beyond the evidence base.
The point of much of science is precisely to make creative use of what is observ-
able in order to get a better understanding of certain phenomena that are not by
themselves observable. Making sense of, and organizing, empirical regularities is just
one aim  but by no means the only aim  of science. And by organizing empiri-
cal regularities, we often nd evidential support for the existence of certain hitherto
unobserved aspects of reality.
3.3 The unobservable, therefore non-existent fallacy
The next misconception is also relevant to Gul and Pesendorfers logical or ana-
lytic claim that the content of any theory in economics consists solely of its choice-
behavioural implications, and that two choice-behaviourally equivalent theories should
be seen as equivalent simpliciter. One route by which one might arrive at this claim
is the following. Suppose one accepts, as Gul and Pesendorfer do, that observations
about peoples choice behaviour are the only evidence that we are entitled to use to
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test our economic theories. And suppose, further, one somehow accepts the principle
that anything that is unobservable does not exist. It then follows that we are not
entitled to treat as real or existent any properties or entities in economics that
go beyond what we can directly observe. And this, by stipulation, is peoples choice
behaviour alone.
But even if we were to suspend our criticism of the assumption that only choice
behaviour is observable in economics, it should be obvious, as a matter of logic, that,
from the fact that a particular entity or phenomenon is not observable, it does not
follow that this entity or phenomenon does not exist. And the conclusion that the
entity or phenomenon does not exist follows even less from the fact that something
is not currently observable. Sometimes we can have strong indirect evidence for
something, even though it is not directly observable.
Electrons and other elementary particles are not, strictly speaking, directly ob-
servable; we can only see their traces, for example, when they travel through a cloud
chamber (as water vapour condenses upon the impact of ionizing particles). But few
people would seriously doubt their existence.
Occams razor principle tells us not to postulate the existence of any unnecessary
entities. So, before we can hypothesize that something exists despite being unobserv-
able, we need to come up with at least some indirect evidence for its existence.
But if the best conrmed and most parsimonious theory of a particular phenomenon
commits us to postulating an entity, then it is fully consistent with Occams razor
principle to accept its existence. The key idea behind the principle is that we should
not postulate too many entities, but neither should we postulate too few.4
3.4 The maximization dogma
Implicitly relying on a particularly strong version of methodological behaviourism,
Gul and Pesendorfer suggest that any economic theory should take the form of a
4We here accept that mental states are not directly observable, and similar in status to the
unobservable entities and properties in other sciences. Hausman (1998) denies that the mental
states posited in economics (e.g., in the form of utility and subjective probability functions) are
unobservables of the same kind as electrons or neutrinos, and argues instead that they should be
seen as part of commonsense reality, like tables and chairs. This is because the functional role
played by utilities and probabilities in economics is virtually identical to that played by desires and
beliefs in folk psychology, and the latter are already among our everyday ontological commitments.
We accept the analogy between the mental states in economics and those in folk psychology, and
ultimately agree with Hausman that those mental states should be considered real. Yet, we think a
further argument is needed to convince the skeptic that mental states in both folk psychology and
economics can be seen as real, despite their prima-facie unobservable status (or at most indirectly
observable status). Our argument in this paper is intended to ll this gap. Several contributions to
the realism-antirealism debate in economics (as reviewed, e.g., in Hausman 1998) either deny or
do not develop the analogy between the mental states posited in economics and the unobservables
posited in the natural sciences, and hence that debate is somewhat orthogonal to our concerns here.
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characterization of the totality of its choice-behavioural implications, and that this
characterization should ideally take the form of attributing to the agents in question
the maximization of some objective function. However, while it may be a useful
starting point for the explanation of behaviour to search for some objective function a
given agent maximizes, there is no principled reason why our best theories of economic
behaviour should necessarily be based on the notion of maximization.
Which form of a theory best explains human behaviour is ultimately a contingent,
empirical question, which can be settled only by actual scientic research, not by
methodological stipulation. Just as it has turned out to be wrong  given Einsteins
general theory of relativity  that space and time must necessarily be Euclidean (as
Immanuel Kant, for example, assumed), so there is no a priori reason to think that
the explanation of social and economic behaviour must necessarily be based on the
maximization of a single objective function. For example, an empirically adequate
theory might model agents as being governed by a more complex system of constraints.
Of course, current attempts to explain economic behaviour in a way that is not
based on maximization, such as theories of satiscing as introduced by Herbert Simon
(1956) or theories of fast and frugal heuristics as proposed by Gerd Gigerenzer and
others (e.g., 2000), remain controversial, but the mere fact that these are well-dened
and eligible contenders for economic theories illustrates that the maximization of a
single objective function is not the only form an economic explanation can take. The
reason economists are divided over Simons and Gigerenzers theories is not that these
theories have the wrong form per se, but rather that it is unclear whether they o¤er
the best explanations of the empirical phenomena they are intended to explain.
4 A primer in the philosophy of science
We have identied four misconceptions underlying Gul and Pesendorfers (and no
doubt others) arguments for behaviourism in economics. To clarify the distinction
between behaviourism and mentalism further, we need to introduce some key concepts
from the philosophy of science: the concepts of (i) a theory, (ii) empirical adequacy
of a theory, (iii) an ontological commitment, and (iv) underdetermination of theory
by evidence.
4.1 What is a theory?
On the standard approach (which goes back to Karl Popper and Carl Gustav Hempel;
see, e.g., Woodward 2009), a theory is a set of sentences (in some denitions, a set of
propositions), which is ideally:
(i) closed under implication (so that the theory can be identied with the body of
its implications), and
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(ii) expressible as the set of implications of a nite (ideally small) set of basic
principles or axioms (called the theory formulation), perhaps together with some
auxiliary assumptions.
Newtonian physics is a paradigm example of a theory in this sense. Here, the theory
formulation consists of Newtons three basic laws of motion and his law of universal
gravitation, and the theory itself consists of all the implications of those basic princi-
ples. To arrive at a Newtonian theory of a specic physical system, such as the solar
system, we further need to add some auxiliary assumptions, especially about the ini-
tial conguration of the relevant bodies (their masses, positions, and forces acting on
them). The theorys predictions about the systems behaviour over time will then be
among the relevant body of implications. There are also some alternative denitions
of a theory in the literature (e.g., van Fraassen 1980), but for present purposes, the
standard denition will su¢ce.5
4.2 When is a theory (empirically) adequate?
A theory  call it T  is said to be adequate with respect to a body of sentences S if
and only if those sentences are among the theorys implications, formally if and only
if T logically entails S. Usually, we are interested in a theorys adequacy with respect
to the set of those sentences whose truth we can empirically observe (the so-called
observation sentences). We then also speak of empirical adequacy. (To make the
denition applicable in practice, some relevant auxiliary assumptions may typically
need to be included in T .)
For example, Newtonian physics, together with some auxiliary assumptions, is
at least approximately adequate with respect to the observation sentences about the
motion of the planets around the sun, or about the way an apple falls from a tree.
It is not adequate, on the other hand, with respect to a body of sentences about the
behaviour of objects whose velocity is close to the speed of limit, as Einstein famously
pointed out.
Empirical adequacy  or at least approximate empirical adequacy (a notion that
could be analyzed further)  is typically considered a minimal desideratum on a good
scientic theory. Importantly, empirical adequacy of a theory is not the same as
truth of that theory. Truth is a more demanding, and more elusive, notion. As we
will discuss below, logically, there can exist two or more rival theories that are each
empirically adequate with respect to a particular body of observations, but only one
of which, at best, may be true.
5The main rival to the standard, syntactic denition of a theory given here is a semantic denition
(as exemplied by van Fraassen 1980), according to which a theory is a set of models (with a certain
structure), rather than a set of sentences (with a certain structure). Many subtly di¤erent variants
of each denition can be given. The details are not the focus of this paper.
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4.3 What are the ontological commitments of a theory?
To dene the notion of an ontological commitment of a theory, we rst need to
introduce a basic notion from formal logic: the notion of a semantic interpretation of
the language in which the theory is expressed. This is
 an assignment of truth-values to all sentences in that language,
which, in turn, is based on
 a denition of one or several domains of objects (depending on how many types
of objects the theory refers to),
 an interpretation of all predicates, relations, and functions that the theory uses,
as predicates, relations, and functions over the relevant objects, and
 an assignment of objects to all constant symbols used by the theory.
We call a semantic interpretation that renders a given theory true (i.e., which assigns
the truth-value true to all sentences of the theory) a model of that theory. Any
consistent theory has at least one model, and typically many. Each such model
corresponds to one possible way the world could be  one possible world  consistently
with the theory. The domain of objects (or family of domains) of that model then
represents the objects that exist in that particular world, and the predicates, relations,
and functions correspond to the properties of, and relations between, those objects.
Obviously, some models of a given theory may be sparser  i.e., have smaller
domains of objects and/or fewer properties of, and relations between, these objects 
than others. However, by considering all possible models of the theory (at most ex-
cluding certain trivial or non-standard models), we can ask which kinds of objects,
properties, and relations are present in all of them. These can be seen as the objects,
properties, and relations the theory is minimally committed to. We call them the
ontological commitments of the theory.
This notion of an ontological commitment is extremely natural. Consider, for
example, the theory of arithmetic as dened by the Peano axioms, which are the
fundamental axioms of arithmetic. Any standard model of these axioms, however it
is dened, will have a domain of objects with the formal properties of the natural
numbers. Accordingly  and as we would intuitively expect  the natural numbers
are among the ontological commitments of Peano arithmetic.
Similarly, consider the standard theory of particle physics, which o¤ers a unied
theory of electromagnetic, weak, and strong nuclear interactions, while still leaving
out gravity. Just as the natural numbers are a common presence in any model of Peano
arithmetic, so certain kinds of elementary particles can be found in any non-trivial
model of the standard theory of particle physics, such as quarks, leptons (of which
electrons are special cases), and di¤erent kinds of bosons. Most of these have also
been experimentally identied, using instruments such as the Large Hadron Collider
at CERN, Switzerland, but notoriously the Higgs boson still remains empirically
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undiscovered. The theory is committed to its existence, however, since the theory
could not be true without it.
The present notion of an ontological commitment underlies Quines famous dictum
[t]o be is to be the value of a variable (1948) and captures the so-called naturalistic
attitude towards ontological questions we nd in standard scientic practice (Fine
1984, Musgrave 1989). To gure out what entities, properties, and relations there
are in any given area, according to this attitude, we should not engage in armchair
metaphysical reasoning, but simply consult our best scientic theories of that area.
Unless we have independent reasons to doubt those theories, we should take their
ontological commitments at face value. If our best physical theories tell us that there
are quarks, leptons, and bosons, we have every reason to believe in these particles
existence, regardless of their unobservable status.
4.4 Underdetermination of theory by evidence
Let S (a set of sentences) be our body of evidence  perhaps even the maximal body
of evidence we could hypothetically obtain  and let T be the theory that we have
come up with. Even if the theory is adequate with respect to the evidence, the logical
relationship between theory and evidence is typically a one-way, rather than two-way,
relationship. The theory, T , entails the evidence, S, but not the other way round; S
is certainly a subset of T (assuming adequacy), but T goes beyond S. In particular,
T also has some unobservable implications.
The key lesson of this point is that, in principle but often also in practice, there
can be two or more distinct theories that coincide in their observable implications
(and therefore in their adequacy with respect to our evidence), but which are in fact
logically incompatible with respect to some unobservable implications. In such a
case, we say that our theory is underdetermined by the evidence. This problem was
famously discussed by Quine (e.g., 1975; see also List 1999).
The simplest illustration of this problem in economics is given by the assignment
of a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function to an agent. As is well known, there
is not just one utility function that ts a given agents choice behaviour, but an
innite number. The function is unique only up to positive a¢ne transformations. Of
course, in the present example, nothing much hinges on the properties of the function
that are left underdetermined, such as whether the agents utility in one situation is
twice as large as that in another. Indeed, most economists would not consider such
statements meaningful. The underdetermination problem would only come to trouble
us, for instance, if we wanted to use von-Neumann-Morgenstern utilities as the basis
for interpersonal comparisons (for further discussion and literature review, see List
2003).
Generally, however, the problem of underdetermination of theory by evidence
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raises important questions for the status of the unobservable implications of any
theory and its ontological commitments. When a theory is underdetermined by the
evidence (so that there could be a rival theory with di¤erent unobservable implications
and di¤erent ontological commitments), we face the question of whether there is a
fact of the matter about the theorys unobservables:
 If there is a fact of the matter, we have an instance of mere underdetermina-
tion. One of the theories is correct in its unobservable implications, including
its ontological commitments; we just dont know which one it is. This is an
epistemological problem.
 If there is no fact of the matter, we have an instance of indeterminacy. The
theorys unobservable implications do not correspond to anything in the world.
The theorys unobservables are at best useful ctions, at worst meaningless.
This is an ontological problem.
The main insight to be gained from this philosophy-of-science primer, for present
purposes, is that the question of what our evidence for a particular theory is and,
more broadly, what the largest body of observation sentences could possibly be, is
fundamentally distinct from, and not to be confused with, the question of what the
theorys ontological commitments are.
5 Two kinds of revealed preference approaches
We are now in a position to distinguish more clearly between two kinds of revealed
preference approaches to economic theory, and to see whether they commit us to
behaviourism (for classical works on revealed preferences, see Samuelson 1938, Richter
1966, and Sen 1971). One kind of approach is dened in terms of an epistemological
thesis, the other in terms of an ontological one. As we will see, only one of the two
theses  arguably the less plausible one  is genuinely behaviouristic, while the other
is fully compatible with mentalism.
An epistemological revealed preference thesis: Our body of evidence for a
theory in economics  the set of observation sentences  is restricted to agents choice
behaviour.
An ontological revealed preference thesis: The ontological commitments
of any theory in economics  or at least those ontological commitments that we are
entitled to take seriously  are restricted to agents choices and choice dispositions
(and therefore exclude, for example, mental states).
Although we have already disputed that the evidence base should be xed as
stated by the epistemological thesis, some economists might still accept this thesis for
stipulative reasons: they might stipulate that what demarcates economics from neigh-
bouring disciplines such as psychology is its reliance on choice-behavioural evidence,
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Figure 2: Possible views about revealed preferences
rather than richer psychological evidence. This justication for the epistemological
revealed preference thesis may seem ad hoc, but it is not incoherent.
The ontological thesis, by contrast, is much harder to defend. At least in the
technical sense explained above, certain mental states  such as preferences and/or
beliefs  are simply among the ontological commitments of standard economic theory.
As soon as the theory refers to an agents utility and subjective probability functions,
any model of the theory will include the relevant functions among its structural
elements, and so these functions will be among the theorys ontological commitments.
Moreover, standard economic theory has these ontological commitments even if we
use only choice-behavioural evidence to establish its adequacy. This shows that the
epistemological revealed preference thesis does not imply the ontological one, and
thus the epistemological thesis is compatible with the existence of underlying mental
states. Indeed, the etymology of the term revealed preferences suggests just this:
an agents behaviour reveals  is evidence for  something other than behaviour,
namely the agents mental state  his or her preferences  which causes the behaviour
in question.
Radical behaviourists might repond that, even if there is a technical sense in which
mental states are among the ontological commitments of economic theory, we have
no reason to treat those ontological commitments seriously, i.e., to treat the implied
mental states as anything other than theoretical constructs: they may be ontological
commitments in a technical sense, but not in any real sense.
Thus behaviourists and mentalists are divided on two questions: rst, whether
or not the evidence base of economics should be restricted to choice behaviour and
choice dispositions, and secondly, whether the mental states ascribed by economic
theories should be treated as mere auxiliary constructs or as real phenomena. Figure
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2 shows the di¤erent possible views.
6 An argument for mentalism
Our objections to the radical behaviourist view should already be evident from our
discussion. We now wish to state our argument for mentalism more positively. Re-
call that a radical behaviourist holds the view that even if certain mental states are
technically among economic theorys ontological commitments, they are still noth-
ing more than representation devices: they may be instrumentally useful for making
sense of behavioural regularities, but they do not correspond to anything real. As our
philosophy-of-science primer should indicate, however, this view misses the central
idea underlying the naturalistic attitude towards ontological questions. When some-
thing is an ontological commitment of a theory, this simply means that the theory
says it exists. To ask whether the entity or property in question really exists, after
it has been established as one of the theorys ontological commitments, is to ask one
question too many  or alternatively, it is to express doubts about the theory itself.
The naturalistic argument for mentalism in economics can be summarized as
follows:6
Premise 1: Some mental states  such as beliefs and desires  are technically
among the ontological commitments of our current best economic theories of human
social decision making.
Premise 2: In science, the criterion for whether something is to be treated as real
is simply whether it is technically among the ontological commitments of our current
best theory or theories in the relevant area (assuming we have no special reasons to
doubt those theories themselves).
Premise 3: Economics is a science like any other.
Conclusion: The mental states that our best economic theories ascribe to eco-
nomic agents are to be treated as real (unless we have special reasons to doubt those
theories themselves).
The argument is clearly valid (i.e., the premises logically entail the conclusion).
Whether the argument is also sound depends on whether the premises are all true.
Given the nature of practically all our current (micro-)economic theories, ranging
from classical rational choice theory to more recent behaviourally oriented theories,
Premise 1 is true in light of the technical denition of an ontological commitment.
Premise 2 is equally true, since it states a basic principle underlying standard scientic
practice (namely the naturalistic ontological attitude). Premise 3 is a claim that
6Some of the philosophical ideas underlying this naturalistic argument are developed in List (2011).
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critics of economics might wish to challenge, but we doubt that scientically minded
economists would wish to go along that route.
Consequently, the only way to avoid the mentalistic conclusion would be to insist
on having special doubts about our economic theories themselves, despite their status
as our current best scientic theories in the relevant area. But those asserting such
doubts would then have to explain what evidence underpins them. We suspect that
few economists would wish to make their argument against mentalism dependent on a
rejection of the adequacy of our best economic theories themselves. We conclude that
just as we have strong prima-facie reasons to accept the reality of quarks, leptons,
and bosons in particle physics, so we have strong prima-facie reasons to accept the
reality of mental states in economics.
7 Does the di¤erence between mentalism and behav-
iourism matter?
At rst sight, one might think that the di¤erence between mentalism and behav-
iourism is a purely metaphysical matter, which is only of limited signicance for the
practice of economics itself. But this impression is misleading. That the di¤erence
matters also in practice can be seen by revisiting the empirical underdetermination
problem, the problem that there can exist two or more distinct theories that are
empirically equivalent but logically incompatible.
First consider the case of no underdetermination. Take a simple choice problem
without risk or uncertainty, where an agent has perfectly well-behaved choice dis-
positions over some options, satisfying all the standard rationality conditions. The
agents choice dispositions  formally represented by a choice function  can then be
uniquely rationalized by a preference ordering over the given options (e.g., Sen 1971).
Although this is technically a mental state ascription, preference orderings and choice
functions stand in a one-to-one correspondence in this case. So long as rationalization
of choices is required to take the form of ascribing to the agent a weak ordering, there
is no underdetermination of preferences by choice dispositions here: there exists one
and only one preference ordering that entails the given choice dispositions.7 Conse-
quently, there are no logical implications of the mental state ascription that go beyond
what is already encoded in the choice function itself, and no issues of indeterminacy
arise: there are behaviourally observable facts about everything the theory says.
Now consider a less idealized case. A much-discussed example is due to Amartya
Sen (1993).
7Note that if we lift the requirement that rationalization take the form of the ascription of a
weak ordering to the agent, and allow other forms of rationalization (e.g., in terms of other binary
relations), then the underdetermination problem can arise even in the present case of choice without
risk or uncertainty.
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The polite dinner-party guest: Given a choice between a large, a medium-
sized, and a small apple, a dinner-party guest (who normally prefers bigger apples to
smaller ones) picks the medium-sized apple, for politeness. If the large apple is no
longer available while the medium-sized and small ones are, the guest picks the small
apple, again for politeness.
The agents choice function violates contraction consistency and cannot be ratio-
nalized by a preference ordering over apples. It would be a bad explanation, however,
to suggest that the agent is irrational; this explanation would violate the principle of
charity in interpretation (see, e.g., Davidson 1973). Rather, the agent is motivated
by considerations over and above the sizes of the apples. However, if the agents
choice behaviour is the only evidence we can go by  for example, we cannot ask
the agent any questions about the reasons for his or her choices  then we face an
underdetermination problem. Several distinct hypotheses entail the same choice be-
haviour, ranging from the hypothesis that the agent has complicated (and perhaps
non-consequentialist) preferences over extended alternatives (object-context pairs)
to the hypothesis that he or she is governed by various norms of politeness, approval-
or esteem-seeking, or other social constraints (e.g., Bhattacharyya, Pattanaik, and
Xu 2011; Bossert and Suzumura 2009; Suzumura and Xu 2001; Brennan and Pettit
2005). The agents choice dispositions alone are insu¢cient to distinguish between
these (and other) rival explanations.
Does this mean that there is no fact of the matter as to what the correct explana-
tion is? Both our psychological understanding and the practices of other behavioural
sciences suggest that there can be a real di¤erence between di¤erent rival explana-
tions, despite their choice-behavioural equivalence. Apart from attributing di¤erent
rst-person experiences to the agent (which would lead us to predict di¤erent in-
trospective reports from him or her, if we could elicit a truthful response), di¤erent
explanations may also have di¤erent repercussions further down the line. Only some
but not all explanations may cohere with our explanations of other related phenom-
ena, so that good scientic practice would give us a coherence-based criterion for
choosing some explanations over others.
Setting dogma aside, the natural view is that although choice-behavioural evi-
dence often underdetermines our theoretical explanation of peoples choices, a suit-
ably broadened evidence base may allow us to distinguish between di¤erent rival
hypotheses. Such a broadened evidence base might include evidence about other
related social phenomena, di¤erent kinds of psychological data, verbal reports, and
occasionally (for plausibility checks) even introspection. In short, the availability of
di¤erent choice-behaviourally equivalent explanations does not imply that there is
no fact of the matter as to what the real reasons for an agents choices are. Several
recent theoretical proposals in decision theory emphasize the importance of reasons
for choice over and above the choice behaviour induced by them (e.g., Manzini and
17
Mariotti 2007, 2012; Cherepanov, Feddersen, and Sandroni 2008; Dietrich and List
2012a,b; Mandler, Manzini, and Mariotti 2012). Some of them explicitly employ
mentalist terminology (e.g., moods and mindsets in Manzini and Mariotti 2012;
rationales in Cherepanov et al. 2008; and motivating reasons and weighing of
reasons in Dietrich and List 2012a,b).
In sum, in cases of undermination, good scientic practice requires us to consider
all the di¤erent rival explanations and then creatively to identify an enriched evi-
dence base, and more advanced empirical designs, to determine which explanation is
most adequate. Even if we fail to nd a purely empirical criterion for picking out a
unique correct theory, Occams razor principle would tell us to choose a theory which
is ontologically not too rich, but also not too sparse, to explain our observations
parsimoniously.
8 Can economics be reduced to neuroscience?
Many neuroscientists hope to dispense with traditional psychological theories by ex-
plaining psychological phenomena in terms of neurophysiological processes in the
brain (for a recent debate, see Bennett et al. 2007). Similarly, some of the most
radical neuroeconomists hope to dispense with traditional economic theories by ex-
plaining economic behaviour in terms of the relevant agents brain processes (see, e.g.,
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2005). At rst sight, one might think that scientic
progress is inexorably headed in this direction, and many advances in science seem to
conrm this picture. We are developing a better understanding of the micro-level
mechanisms underlying many macro-level phenomena, for instance the biochemical
mechanisms underlying the functioning of cells, the cellular mechanisms underlying
the life of organisms, and the individual-level mechanisms underlying larger social
processes. The search for micro-foundations of macroscopic phenomena, with a view
to replacing less fundamental theories with more fundamental ones, seems to be en
vogue.
Yet, there is a common misconception underlying many of these attempts at the-
ory reduction. The misconception can be termed the supervenience implies explana-
tory reducibility fallacy. To explain this fallacy, let us consider a familiar argument
for theory reduction. Its premise is that the world is fundamentally made up of ele-
mentary particles, atoms, and molecules, which stand in various physical and chemical
relations to each other and whose interaction underlies all more complex phenomena,
including the functioning and behaviour of organisms. More formally:
The supervenience thesis: The totality of micro-level, physical facts about
the world determines all macro-level facts, such as facts about organisms and their
behaviour.
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It is then argued that, because everything in the world supervenes on the phys-
ical, the best explanation of any phenomenon must also be a physical one.
The explanatory-reducibility thesis: Any phenomenon in the world can and
should ideally be explained in terms of underlying physical mechanisms. Any non-
physical explanations  such as psychological or social explanations  are at best
provisional and reect a lack of understanding of underlying mechanisms.
The claim that psychology can be reduced to neuroscience is sometimes defended
in just this way. Psychological phenomena are surely the result of underlying neu-
rophysiological brain processes, and so, the reasoning goes, our most fundamental
explanations of them should also be given at the neurophysiological level. But does
supervenience really imply explanatory reducibility?
A large body of work in philosophy challenges this view, beginning with Jerry
Fodors (1974) and Hilary Putnams (1975) classic arguments that the sheer combi-
natorial complexity of the relationship between the physical states of a persons brain
and the psychological states of his or her mind rules out the e¤ective reducibility of
psychological natural kinds (which are the relata of regularities that we are inter-
ested in) to purely neurophysiological ones.8 What makes macro-level mental states,
such as beliefs and desires, more explanatorily useful than micro-level patterns of
neural activity is precisely that they abstract away from a large number of physical
details that are irrelevant, and even detrimental, to the explanatory purposes at hand.
Supervenience, in short, does not imply explanatory reducibility (for a more recent
defence of this anti-reductionistic view, see List and Menzies 2009).
Think, for example, of how you would explain a cats appearance in the kitchen
when the owner is preparing some food. You could either try (and in reality fail) to
understand the cats neurophysiological processes which begin with (i) some sensory
stimuli, then (ii) trigger some complicated neural responses, and nally (iii) activate
the cats muscles so as to put it on a trajectory towards the kitchen. Or you could
ascribe to the cat (i) the belief that there is food available in the kitchen, and (ii)
the desire to eat, so that (iii) it is rational for the cat to go to the kitchen. It should
be evident that the second explantion is both simpler and more illuminating, o¤ering
much greater predictive power. The belief-desire explanation can easily be adjusted,
for example, if conditions change. If you give the cat some visible or smellable evidence
that food will be available in the living room rather than the kitchen, you can predict
that it will update its beliefs and go to the living room instead. By contrast, one
cannot even begin to imagine the informational overload that would be involved in
adjusting the neurophysiological explanation to accommodate this change.
8More technically, the inverse image, with respect to the relevant supervenience function from
physical brain states to psychological states, of any set of psychological states forming a natural
kind at the psychological level need not be a set of physical brain states forming a natural kind at
the physical level.
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Good explanations  ones that are parsimonious and predictively successful 
should identify the most functionally relevant regularities, while leaving out extrane-
ous details. Functionally relevant regularities, in turn, need not be found at the most
ne-grained level of description. It is an empirical question at which level of descrip-
tion any given system exhibits the most tractable regularities. There is no reason,
for example, why a good theory of forest ecology should refer to quantum-mechanical
e¤ects inside the individual atoms in each tree. Similarly, if you want to explain why
Microsoft Windows crashes if you install a particular software package, you should
rst look at possible programme errors or incorrect system parameters before try-
ing to give a detailed account of the ow of individual electrons in the computers
micro-processor and memory chips.
As Daniel Dennett (1987) has argued, we explain the behaviour of certain organ-
isms in terms of their mental states and not in terms of complicated physical processes
 thereby taking an intentional rather than physical stance  precisely because this
is the level of explanation most suited for the explanatory purpose at hand. A doctor
who wishes to treat a brain hemorrhage or a tumor may well take a physical stance
towards the patient  at least during the medical intervention  but it is far from
clear how much economists can gain from trying to explain socio-economic behaviour
by looking at peoples brains, rather than interpreting their minds.
All of this is consistent, of course, with the idea of enriching the evidence base of
economics when this helps us to distinguish between di¤erent rival theories  and this
could certainly include some neuroeconomic evidence. But it should be clear that
neither the focus on behaviour alone, nor the focus on brain physiology alone, can
deliver satisfactory economic theories.
9 Concluding remarks
We have o¤ered an argument for mentalism, and against behaviourism, in economics.
We have not only responded to the central epistemological and ontological claims
made by behaviourists, but also distinguished mentalism from the more radical neu-
roeconomic view that economic behaviour should be explained in terms of the relevant
agents brain processes, as distinct from their mental states. Gul and Pesendorfer
(2008) seem to miss this distinction, frequently equating the mental with the neural,
and treating what might be interpreted as an argument for a brainless economics as
an argument for a mindless economics instead.
Our present critique of behaviourism di¤ers from other, more familiar critiques of
behaviourism and revealed preference approaches (for earlier critiques, see, among
many others, Hausman 2000 and K½oszegi and Rabin 2007). The behaviouristic ac-
count of preferences (and other mental states such as beliefs) is often criticized for
what it fails to deliver: (i) it fails to say anything about human psychology and
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motivation, from which it is explicitly disconnected; (ii) it fails to provide adequate
foundations for normative economics, as it gives at most an impoverished account of
human well-being, says nothing about fundamental desires and needs, and renders
interpersonal comparisons of utility impossible (all of which seem to matter to policy-
making); and (iii) it fails to explain behaviour in a non-circular way, since behaviour
is explained by preferences (or other attributes) that are in turn dened in terms of
behaviour.
While we think that such arguments are important and can be  indeed have been
 made, we have taken an entirely di¤erent approach here. Those earlier arguments
all construe economics as a discipline that should deliver more than a theory of choice
(providing an account of, for example, certain psychological features of agents, nor-
matively relevant features beyond revealed preferences, or non-circular explananda of
choice). This premise is not shared by many orthodox economists who, when pressed,
are prepared to dene (micro-)economics as the formal science of choice behaviour.
Such a science should be as free as possible from normative assumptions and should
play no therapeutic role, in Gul and Pesendorfers provocative terminology. Critics
of behaviourism who presuppose a broader denition of the discipline have little hope
of convincing those who endorse the narrow, choice-centered denition. By contrast,
our present critique should convince also those who view economics as a science of
choice behaviour alone, devoid of any further psychological or normative goals. Our
naturalistic argument shows that even if one is not interested in mental states as
such, ones theory of choice may well have to take them on board. A theory of choice
may have to be a theory about more than choice.
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